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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the nexus between digital financial inclusion (DFI) and levels of 
bank risk-taking, using a sample of 283 commercial banks (Islamic and conventional) 
from six countries over the period 2011 to 2019 and deploying panel-corrected standard 
errors, two-stage least squares-instrumental variables and dynamic panel two-step 
generalized method of moments estimators. The findings suggest that Islamic banks 
take more risks than their counterpart conventional banks. The empirical evidence also 
indicates that an increase in the DFI index score reduces the overall level of bank risk-
taking and increases that of banking stability for commercial and conventional banks 
compared to Islamic ones. A strong association between DFI and bank risk-taking 
suggests that DFI not only reduces the default risk, leverage risk and portfolio risk of 
banks, but also increases financial mobility in the sample countries. Consequently, an 
inclusive digitalised banking industry ensures sustainable economic growth, which is 
likely to help maintain financial sustainability in times of crisis such as the Covid-19 
pandemic. Our results are shown to be robust by various robustness checks. The study 
contributes to both the Islamic and conventional banking, as well as the digital financial 
inclusion, literature. The findings of the study provide various policy implications for 
policymakers and standard-setters in the countries examined.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Based on the banking literature and modern banking theory, it is evident that 
banking stability and performance appear to be subject to any crisis or uncertainty 
emerging from financial markets, the nature of borrowers, and the nature of 
depositors, with whom banking interaction is intrinsically intertwined (Sarmiento 
& Galán, 2017). Such crisis situations or uncertainty are termed as bank risk-
taking behaviour, which indicates the capability of certain banks to endure risks 
during periods of uncertainty, with the risk-taking tendency depending on their 
corporate governance strategy, regulatory framework, and competition (Agoraki, 
Delis, & Pasiouras, 2011; Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt, Huizinga, & Ma, 2013; 
Wagner, 2010). Bank risk-taking behaviour determines various respects of banking 
stability. Therefore, to enhance the performance level and financial stability, banks 
are inclined to take more risks (Sarmiento & Galán, 2017), which mostly depend 
on the nature of the financial market and the banking regulatory framework 
(Flannery, 2009; Hughes & Mester, 2008). However, the abrupt slowdown of the 
financial market during and after the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 shook 
the global financial sector, especially the banking sector. To recover from the 
consequences of the GFC, the banking industry initiated many short- and long- 
term measures, such as financial inclusion (henceforth FI), which enhanced bank 
risk-taking tendencies and consequently ensured banking stability (Ahamed & 
Mallick, 2019; Banna, Alam, Ahmad, & Sari, 2020a). Appropriate implementation 
of FI in the banking sector helped it recover its losses and regain financial stability 
by enhancing the risk-taking resilience of the banking industry (Al-Smadi, 2018; 
Banna et al., 2020a; Van, Nguyen, & Vo, 2020).
Besides FI, banks are in the process of implementing digital financial 
inclusion (DFI), thus benefitting from technological advancement. Before the 
current pandemic, application of DFI in the banking sector had been progressing 
gradually. However, the current Covid-19 pandemic has encouraged its fully-
fledged application, since most countries have implemented lockdowns, 
quarantine, and social distancing measures to prevent the exponential spread of 
the virus (Atkeson, 2020; Banna, 2020a). All these measures prevent people from 
making physical transactions. Therefore, policymakers realised the urgent need 
for DFI. DFI is an extension of FI, allowing contactless transactions in a cashless 
or remote manner conducted through a smart phone or other electronic device 
connected to the internet. Through the application of DFI, both service providers 
and receivers gain advantages (Klapper, 2017). With regard to the current crisis, 
the Covid-19 pandemic has drastically impacted the financial sector, in particular 
the banking sector, and its nature is no less deadly than that of the GFC, hence it 
is obvious how banks’ risk-taking tendency is influenced by DFI, which has also 
been an important topic in the literature.
1.2. Objectives 
In the current crisis, banks are undertaking their functions through the execution 
of DFI, whose widespread application is hoped will maintain banking stability. To 
do this, banks need to extend their risk-taking behaviour, as failure to do so might 
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have a negative impact on bank stability (Koetter, 2008; Malikov, Restrepo-Tobon, 
& Kumbhakar, 2015). Therefore, this study aims to assess the association between 
DFI and bank risk-taking behaviour. It investigates the impact of DFI, since in 
the Covid-19 situation this has become the only means to operate banking affairs. 
Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether the application of DFI has a 
positive or negative impact on risk-taking behaviour. Determining such an impact 
will create awareness, which will help to gauge the level of risks banks should take 
to face any uncertainty. 
Therefore, this study aims to empirically investigate the impact of DFI on bank 
risk-taking behaviour in the context of the dual banking system. In addition, it 
intends to determine whether DFI has more impact on conventional or Islamic 
banks in terms of their risk-taking behaviour. The study places relative importance 
on Islamic banks, since globally Islamic finance is experiencing a 15% to 20% growth 
rate per annum (Hancock, 2013), with the assets of Islamic banking in commercial 
banks in 2013 set to exceed USD 1.7 trillion (Ernst & Young, 2013). Moreover, after 
the GFC, Islamic banks were more capable of regaining their financial stability 
compared to their conventional counterparts (Ahmed, Mohieldin, Verbeek, & 
Aboulmagd, 2015; Banna et al., 2020a). Moreover, both conventional and Islamic 
banks are always in competition in terms of profit maximisation, strategy setting, 
and financial stability.
The study is expected to contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, 
unlike previous studies, it empirically investigates the impact of DFI on bank risk-
taking tendencies by considering dual banking data. Second, it considers global 
banking data from countries that practise dual banking, since Covid-19 has affected 
the global banking sector and economy (Wójcik & Ioannou, 2020). Therefore, the 
study will enrich the existing literature related to the dual banking system. Finally, 
to check for robustness, various types of econometric techniques are deployed to 
establish the association between DFI and bank risk-taking tendencies during and 
after the Covid-19 pandemic era. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 comprises the 
literature review, which is followed by presentation of the data sources and 
methodology in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results and analysis, with 
concluding remarks and policy recommendations made in Section 5. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Background Theory
Every aspect of human life is prone to risk-taking, so is an integral part of people’s 
daily lives (Ale, 2009; Trimpop, 1994). Therefore, whatever decisions people make, 
they first consider the risks and threats that might subsequently occur (Yates, 1992). 
Similarly, institutions also tend to take risks for their betterment and success, 
though some consider it as a potential loss of money and safety (Yates, 1992). The 
theory of risk-taking behaviour goes back to Richard Cantillon and John Stuart 
Mill, and was later modified in 1890 by the prominent economist Alfred Marshal 
(Landstrom, 2007). The theory considers that institutions or entrepreneurs are 
inclined to take risks for their own sustainability. They should take risks at a 
level they can support. If they take intolerable risks, they may face ruin instead 
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of progress or success. However, some institutions are willing to take a high level 
of risks and challenges, whereas others prefer to take moderate risks that they 
can tolerate, based on the various types of resources they possess. Therefore, the 
banking industry was prone to risk-taking in a heightened manner after the GFC 
as a survival measure to retain its sustainability (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 2010). Risk-taking in the banking industry has been considered as 
an important element that determines banking production (Hughes, Mester, & 
Moon, 2001). Moreover, banking efficiency is also associated with credit risk and 
capitalisation (Berger & DeYoung, 1997; Naceur & Omran, 2011). Many studies 
show that highly capitalised banks are more cost efficient (Altunbas, Carbo, 
Gardener, & Molyneux, 2007; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, & Molyneux, 2011) as 
they likely to take greater risks at moments of uncertainty, as was clearly evident 
after the GFC. This was because any kind of uncertainty reduces informational 
asymmetries, triggers more market competition, and leads banks to look for 
greater yields in more risky projects (Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2006; Keeley, 1990). 
As a result, during and after the GFC, banks were inclined to more risk-taking 
through inclusive financial products and services in the form of financial inclusion. 
However, nowadays FI has been replaced with DFI, which has made financial 
affairs easily accessible by the public. Easily accessible and affordable financial 
services provided by the financial sector have the capacity to reduce agency 
problems, as well as reducing the information asymmetries between creditors 
and debtors (Beck, Lin, & Ma, 2014). Moreover, such types of inclusive finance 
are also capable of minimising the volatility of banking sector volatility, as they 
help banks collect more deposits from more clients, which ultimately increases 
the liquidity of the banking sector (Han & Melecky, 2013) and hence reduces bank 
risk-taking tendencies. Through the expansion of financial services, banks reduce 
the volatility of return as they avoid more costly and risky money market funds 
(Kacperczyk & Schnabl, 2013). 
2.2. Relevant Empirical Studies 
As both financial inclusion and digital financial inclusion are interlinked, providing 
reliable definitions of them will make the study more comprehensive. Both terms 
have been defined by various bodies in several contexts. The United Nations 
(2015, p. 1) defines financial inclusion as “access to a full suite of financial services, 
provided with quality, for everyone who can use financial services, thereby leading 
to an increase financial capability.” The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) states that “financial inclusion means that households and businesses 
have access and can effectively use appropriate financial services. Such services 
must be provided responsibly and sustainably, in a well-regulated environment” 
(CGAP, 2014, p. 1). Together with the definitions of financial inclusion, those of 
DFI have also been made from different perspectives. The World Bank (2015, p. 1) 
defines DFI as “the deployment of the cost-saving digital means to reach currently 
financially excluded and underserved populations with a range of formal financial 
services suited to their needs that are responsibly delivered at a cost affordable 
to customers and sustainable for providers.” In similar terms, CGAP (2015) also 
states that DFI is “digital access to, and the use of, formal financial services by 
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the excluded and underserved population.” Moreover, Manyika, Lund, Singer, 
White and Berry (2016, p. 4) explain that digital finance refers to “financial services 
delivered via mobile phones, the internet or cards”. 
Innovation in the field of technology has been a blessing for the world, and 
is transforming the global financial sector, especially the banking sector, with the 
move from cash-based to cashless transactions in the form of DFI. However, the 
global financial sector has been drastically affected by the Covid-19 pandemic, 
which has corroded the global economy. Due to the pandemic, the banking sector 
is facing liquidity pressure, which creates a liquidity crisis (Li, Strahan, & Zhang, 
2020) and in turn increases banks’ non-performing loans and increases their risk-
taking (Wójcik & Ioannou, 2020). Liquidity crises have a significant influence on 
bank risk taking. The study of Dahir Ahmed, Mahat Fauziah and Ali Noor Azman 
(2018), employing a sample of 57 banks from BRICS countries over the period 
2006 to 2015, found that funding liquidity risk had a negative influence on bank 
risk-taking. As liquidity risk decreases, bank risk-taking tendencies increase, and 
vice versa. A country’s policy framework, economic stability, and sound political 
environment encourage higher levels of bank risk-taking, which ultimately 
upholds credit market competition (Ashraf, 2017). Higher levels of risk-taking are 
likely to maximise banks’ profits and augment bank efficiency, although the risk-
taking might be heterogeneous among banks in terms of their size and ownership 
(Sarmiento & Galán, 2017). As banks in the current crisis are applying DFI in their 
transactions, the interlink between DFI and risk-taking tendency is the topic of the 
study. The previous research of Kammoun, Loukil, & Loukil (2020) in the context 
of the MENA region shows that the application of Fintech (DFI) fosters economic 
performance and financial stability by efficiently handling any risks and threats in 
the region, even in times of unrest and political instability. Full application of DFI 
augments the profitability of the banking sector, which ensures banking stability 
and minimises bank risk-taking (Ozili, 2018). When bank risk is minimised, banks 
become financially stable. Using the data of 4168 banks from 28 EU countries over 
the period 2010-2017, the recent study of Danisman and Tarazi (2020) shows that 
wider and affordable inclusion of financial services has a great stabilising impact 
on the European banking industry. Their study also focuses on digital payment 
systems, through which deprived classes of people such as those in rural areas, 
and the young, unemployed, and uneducated, can be included in formal financial 
services, which helps EU banks attain financial stability by reducing their risks 
and threats. 
By deploying the GMM approach, Van et al. (2020) recently conducted an 
empirical study using a sample of 3071 Asian banks and found that more financial 
inclusion by banks ensures greater bank resilience, as FI helps banks reduce costs, 
augment revenue, minimise risk and expand market share. In addition, interest 
rates also have an impact on bank risk-taking behaviour. Lower interest rates 
promote a higher level of risk-taking tendency (Delis & Kouretas, 2011). Bank risk-
taking behaviour is also highly impacted by the diversification of shareholders. In 
the context of the European banking sector, the empirical study of García-Kuhnert, 
Marchica, & Mura (2015) found that banks with investors from diversified sectors 
were prone to take more risks, resulting in financial stability and development.
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Furthermore, many studies have also investigated how bank risk-taking 
tendency is influenced by other factors. For example, risk-taking behaviour is 
influenced by financial liberalisation (Cubillas & González, 2014); corporate 
control (Anderson & Fraser, 2000); political institutions (Ashraf, 2017); the nature 
of financial crises (Black & Hazelwood, 2013); and the type of national culture 
(Ashraf, Zheng, & Arshad, 2016). Most of these studies have only employed 
proxies for credit risk, disregarding other significant risks such as liquidity crises, 
insolvency problems, and market crises, upon which banks’ stability and efficiency 
also depend (Sarmiento & Galán, 2017). Moreover, risk-taking behaviour is also 
influenced by Fintech or DFI; the recent study of Wang, Liu, and Luo (2020) found 
that the development of Fintech increases the risk-taking behaviour of the banking 
sector. Interestingly, they also find an inverted U-shaped association between 
Fintech development and bank risk-taking; although Fintech initially intensifies 
bank risk-taking, this starts to decrease with further development of it.
However, very few empirical studies have shown the impact of DFI on bank 
risk-taking behaviour. Hence, this study aims to investigate this issue in the 
Covid-19 pandemic era by employing dual banking data, with relatively more 
focus on the Islamic banking industry. 
III. METHODOLOGY
The objective of the research is to examine the relationship between DFI and bank 
risk-taking in a dual banking system. It also aims to establish how this nexus could 
be a possible way forward for the banking industry in facing uncertainty during 
the post-Covid-19 era. The study also seeks to explore any possible differences in 
the nexus for Islamic banks. Therefore, utilising the available data, it is necessary 
to examine the DFI and bank risk-taking nexus before the Covid-19 pandemic. 
This section presents the data sources, the model development and the methods 
used in the study.
3.1. Data
Although many financial institutions provide various financial services to clients, 
this study only considers the banking sector (both Islamic and conventional banks). 
The reason for choosing the dual banking system is that the Islamic banking sector 
was considered to be the most sustainable sector during the GFC compared to its 
counterparts, and it made great contributions to the economic stability of various 
countries (Banna et al., 2020a) as it has nearly USD 1.56 trillion1 in banking assets. 
As a consequence, launching Islamic windows in conventional banks is a rising 
trend. Moreover, keeping pace with the competing conventional banks, Islamic 
banks across the world are gradually introducing various types of digital financial 
services (DFS) (Banna et al., 2020a) to build a wider outreach. In addition, the 
current Covid-19 pandemic is quickly pushing the banking sector towards fully-
fledged implementation of DFS in order to keep the economy stable.
1 Based on IFSB Stability Report 2019
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This study initially considers Bangladesh, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, 
Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey 
and the United Arab Emirates, as these countries hold approximately 95%2 of 
total Islamic banking assets and also operate dual banking systems in which 
conventional and Islamic banks co-exist. However, due to DFI data unavailability, 
the final sample is restricted to six countries, namely Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar and Sudan, which serve as the main focus in examining 
the DFI-bank risk-taking nexus in the context of dual banking systems.
We first chose the annual data of 286 commercial banks, 213 conventional and 
73 Islamic, from the above six countries. However, due to data unavailability and 
missing values, our final sample consisted of 283 commercial banks, of which 
210 were conventional ones and 73 Islamic, with unbalanced panel data over the 
period 2011 to 2019. Our study considers this timeframe as DFI data is mostly 
available from 2011 from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) databases. A breakdown of the sample size is shown in Table 1, in which 
it can be seen that Indonesia has the highest number of banks (40%), followed by 
Bangladesh (20%) and Malaysia (17%).
Various sources were used to collect the data: i) the Bureau van Dijk Orbis 
Bank-Focus database for bank-specific data; ii) the Financial Access Survey (FAS), 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Global Findex databases and individual 
country’s central bank report for DFI data; iii) World Development Indicators 
(WDI), and World Bank database for macroeconomic factors; and iv) previous 
literature for instrumental variable data.
3.1. Model Development
We set up proxies for bank risk-taking, DFI, and other control variables to test the 
effect of DFI on bank risk-taking in dual banking countries.
2 Based on IFSB Stability Report 2018
 Table 1. 
List of Countries and Number of Banks






Bangladesh 56 (416) 19.79 47 9
Indonesia 113 (815) 39.93 102 11
Malaysia 48 (369) 16.96 29 19
Pakistan 33 (254) 11.66 24 9
Qatar 11 (92) 3.89 6 5
Sudan 22 (129) 7.77 2 20
Total 283 (2075) 100 210 73
Note: The number of conventional and Islamic banks is based on the classification and list provided by the Orbis 
bank-focus database. The actual number of banks used in the analysis may vary from model to model. Source: 
Author’s calculation based on Orbis Bank-Focus database
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a. Bank Risk-taking
Three proxies were considered for bank risk-taking: a) default risk, b) leverage risk, 
and c) portfolio risk, as dependent variables following Danisman and Tarazi (2020) 
and Khan, Scheule, and Wu (2017). We employed the z-score for default risk, as 
this is a widely used and well-accepted proxy for bank risk-taking or stability in 
the banking literature (Danisman & Tarazi, 2020; Houston, Lin, Lin, & Ma, 2010; 
Laeven & Levine, 2009). We considered bank risk-taking to be the opposite of bank 
stability. The following formula was used to calculate the z-score:
where ROAAit, EQTit and σ(ROAA)it are the return on average assets, the 
equity to assets ratio, and the standard deviation (sd) of ROAA of bank i in year t, 
respectively. To calculate σ (ROAA), we considered 3-year rolling time windows, 
which are generally sufficient to allow for variation in the z-score. As the z-score 
is highly skewed, we took the natural logarithm to reduce the skewness. The ratio 
implies that the higher the value, the lower banks’ risk-taking. To simplify the 
analysis, we multiplied (-1) by the log(z-score), which suggests that the higher 
the value, the higher the risk-taking. We denoted it as default risk (DR). We also 
decomposed the z-score to obtain the leverage and portfolio risk. Leverage risk 
(LR) and portfolio risk (PR) were proxied by EQT/σ (ROAA) and ROAA/σ (ROAA) 
respectively, following the studies of Danisman and Tarazi (2020) and Lepetit et al. 
(2008). We also took the natural logarithm and multiplied (-1) by both proxies for 
simplicity, in which a higher value represents higher risk-taking.
b. Digital Financial Inclusion Index
We estimated proxies for digital financial inclusion to find the DFI-bank risk-
taking nexus. It was quite difficult to estimate proxies and/or index for DFI due 
to the unavailability of relevant data. However, based on the available data on 
the FAS and Global Findex databases, we took variables that were solely related 
to digital financial activities, including mobile and internet-based financial 
services, which can be enjoyed through electronic devices in a cashless manner. 
In the case of missing values for a particular year, we looked at each country’s 
central bank database, and also used the average value technique. Following 
previous studies (e.g., Ahamed & Mallick, 2019; Banna & Alam, 2020; Banna et 
al., 2020a) on financial inclusion and banking performance, we also considered 
both the access (supply side) and usage (demand side) penetrations for our digital 
financial inclusion index. Previous studies have employed the number of ATMs, 
bank branches, and bank accounts as financial inclusion proxies. In this study, 
mobile money agent and POS (point of sale) terminals per 100,000 adults (AGT_AD), 
and mobile money agent outlets per 1,000 km2 (AGT_KM) for the supply side (both 
geographic and demographic outreach - access to digital finance penetration) were 
considered. For the demand side (use of digital finance penetration) – the number 
of mobile money accounts per 1,000 adults (ACT_AD), the number of mobile and internet 
(1)
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banking transactions (during the reference year) per 1,000 adults (TRANS_N), and 
the value of mobile and internet banking transactions (during the reference year) (% of 
GDP) (TRANS_V) were employed. 
Since the proxies used in building the DFI index were highly correlated 
with each other, an inclusive DFI index was constructed to capture the common 
variation among the proxies using principal component analysis (henceforth 
PCA3). This index dealt sufficiently with the setback of multicollinearity and 
over-parameterisation as a single measure of DFI (Ahamed & Mallick, 2019). We 
measured both the supply side (ACCESS) index and the demand side (USAGE) 
index separately using the PCA. Finally, we combined the two indices to create 
a comprehensive digital financial index (DFI) using the PCA. All three indices 
were normalised using the minimum-maximum normalisation technique to avoid 
unnecessary negative values. 
c. Bank and Macroeconomic Variables
We also controlled for bank-specific as well as country-specific (macroeconomic) 
factors in our analysis. Following previous banking literature (e.g., Ahamed & 
Mallick, 2019; Houston et al., 2010; Laeven & Levine, 2009), we considered the 
following variables as our control variables. For the bank-level variables, to control 
the potential size effect of an individual bank, the logarithm of total assets (Bank 
size – BSIZE) was used, while the ratio of total loans to total assets (Loan share 
- LSH) was employed to account for the liquidity risk of individual banks. To 
control deposit share, a proxy of the ratio of total deposits to total assets (Deposit 
share – DSH) was used. As better management quality can reduce any excessive 
risk-taking tendency, the ratio of total earning assets to total assets (Management 
quality - MGTQ) was taken into consideration. We also controlled the annual 
growth of total assets (Asset growth – AG). In addition, for the country-level 
variables, we controlled two macroeconomic variables, namely real GDP per 
capita growth (GDPPCG) and inflation (INFL). 
 
3.2. Methods 
To investigate the impact of DFI on bank risk-taking, the following baseline 
regression analysis was used:
where Yijt = DR, LR and PR as dependent variables, which are the proxies for 
the bank risk-taking of bank i of country j in year t; DFIjt = the digital financial 
inclusion index of country j in year t; Xijt = bank-specific factors of bank i of country 
j in year t; Zjt = macroeconomic factors of country j in year t; and β, ∅, ω = coefficients 
of the variables and εijt = Error term. 
3 We do not provide the PCA results, but they are available upon request. 
(2)
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The study used both static and dynamic models to make the findings more 
robust. Primarily, the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) method of Beck 
and Katz (1995) was employed, following Alfadli and Rjoub (2019), to find the 
relationship between DFI and bank risk-taking. There were two main reasons for 
choosing this method: i) it reduces prevailing sequential correlation and cross-
sectional dependency problems; and ii) using a suitable instrument, it captures 
the likelihood of endogeneity among the dependent factors and some of the 
independent factors in a particular model. Subsequently, to minimise potential 
endogeneity issues in the form of reverse causality, and following Kim, Batten, 
and Ryu (2020) and Ahamed and Mallick (2019), the two-stage panel least squares 
- instrumental variables (2SLS-IV) method was also used to check the robustness 
of the results. 
Furthermore, dynamic panel two-step system generalised method of moments 
(GMM) was also used to validate the results. We chose GMM because it tackles 
several of the main econometric issues (Ahamed & Mallick, 2019) related to 
this study: i) it eradicates the presence of unobserved bank-specific effects by 
considering the first differences of the independent variables; ii) it mitigates the 
endogeneity issue by using lags of the independent variables; and iii) it also 
captures the dynamic relationship between bank risk-taking and DFI. 
IV. RESULTS
4.1. Results
This section provides the descriptive statistics of the study, the main findings 
and analysis of the relationship between bank risk-taking and DFI. The results of 
various robustness tests are also reported here.
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study for 
both conventional and Islamic banks. Panels A, B and C provide the descriptive 
statistics of the full sample, conventional banks and Islamic banks respectively.
Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max t-test (mean)
Panel A: Full Sample
Bank-Specific
DR (Default risk) 1773 -3.936 1.324 -9.158 3.647 -1.9876**
LR (Leverage risk) 1779 -3.841 1.283 -9.087 1.597 -2.2860**
PR (Portfolio risk) 1640 -1.551 1.481 -6.945 5.617 -0.7233
Bank size (BSIZE) 2075 7.481 1.865 -1.332 12.467 4.3986***
LSH (Loan share) 2066 .585 .174 0 .999 -1.2411
DSH (Deposit share) 2044 .763 .182 0 2.231 -4.0507***
AG (Asset growth) 1822 16.205 25.951 -89.66 286.641 -2.1339**
MGTQ (Managerial quality) 2070 .822 .144 0 1 4.0088***
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Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics (Continued)
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max t-test (mean)
Digital Financial Inclusion-Specific
AGT_KM 2075 974.019 2062.686 .107 7315.652
AGT_AD 2075 580.833 403.919 .099 1386.422
ACT_AD 2075 268.716 295.217 .017 1099.462
TRANS_N 2075 48306.7 95871.5 0 462000
TRANS_V 2075 124.553 156.538 0 566.76
DFI 2075 .343 .261 0 1
ACCESS 2075 .312 .259 0 1
USAGE 2075 .304 .257 0 1
Macroeconomic-specific
GDPPCG (GDP per capita 
growth) 2075 3.802 2.102 -4.858 13.564
INFL (Inflation) 2075 6.326 7.578 -.667 63.293
Instrumental variables
FnF 1871 38.079 14.597 22.315 77.153
MSH 2075 .078 .026 .012 .12
Panel B: Conventional banks 
DR 1301 -3.974 1.338 -9.158 2.879
LR 1305 -3.883 1.297 -9.087 1.597
PR 1201 -1.567 1.523 -6.945 5.617
BSIZE 1517 7.59 1.802 -1.332 12.467
LSH 1513 .582 .167 0 .999
DSH 1500 .753 .162 0 .987
AG 1329 15.416 24.538 -89.66 280.738
MGTQ 1516 .83 .111 .002 1
Panel C: Islamic banks 
DR 472 -3.833 1.28 -7.854 3.647
LR 474 -3.726 1.236 -7.852 1.331
PR 439 -1.507 1.36 -5.407 3.896
BSIZE 558 7.186 1.996 -.302 11.001
LSH 553 .593 .192 .007 .979
DSH 544 .79 .224 0 2.231
AG 493 18.333 29.345 -53.823 286.641
MGTQ 554 .801 .208 0 .997
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2 shows that, based on the mean t-test, conventional banks are 
significantly different to Islamic ones with respect to all types of ratios, apart from 
the loan share ratio. Moreover, in terms of bank risk-taking, Islamic banks tend to 
have more of a tendency towards this than conventional banks, especially in terms 
of default risk and leverage risk. However, no significant difference was found 
between Islamic and conventional banks with regard to portfolio risk.
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Figure 1. 
Various Risk-Taking Comparisons between Islamic and Conventional Banks
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Figure 1 highlights noteworthy differences in the various types of risk-taking 
of the conventional and Islamic banks throughout the sample period (2011 to 2019), 
apart from 2017. Hence, it is suggested that the bank types differ significantly in 
terms of risk-taking, with Islamic banks showing a higher degree of risk-taking, 
but a lower degree of bank stability, compared to conventional banks.
Moreover, on average the sample countries have 974 and 580 agent outlets per 
1000 km2 and per 100k adults respectively. Furthermore, the number of mobile 
money and e-money accounts per 1000 adults is 269, and the number and the 
value of mobile money and internet banking transactions per 1000 adults are 
approximately 48307 and 125 respectively. This indicates that existing bank 
account and mobile money holders are well snug of using the internet and mobile 
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In addition, Figure 2 shows that on an average among the sample countries, 
Bangladesh has a better score for the overall DFI index and ACCESS index, followed 
by Malaysia, while Indonesia is in a better position in terms of the USAGE index. 
On the other hand, Qatar and Sudan have the lowest scores in all the indices. 
Regarding yearly improvement in the index, most of the countries show an upward 
trend. However, the mixed scoring positions of the sample countries suggests that 
there is scope to enhance the DFI index scores.
4.1.2 Digital Financial Inclusion and Bank Risk-taking
This subdivision presents the main results of the study. We started our estimation 
by running the panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) regression model to find 
the nexus between bank risk-taking and DFI (shown in Table 3) using the full 
sample. The reasons behind choosing this method were: i) it has the ability to 
reduce prevailing sequential correlation and cross-sectional dependence problems, 
and ii) it captures the likelihood of endogeneity among the dependent and some of 
the independent factors in a particular model using a suitable instrument (Alfadli 
& Rjoub, 2019). 
Our analysis is based on two dimensions: first, three proxies of bank risk-
taking – DR (Models 1-3), LR (Models 4-6) and PR (Models 7-9) and second, three 
indices of DFI – the Overall DFI index (Models 1, 4 and 7), ACCESS (Models 2, 5 
and 8) and USAGE (models 3, 6 and 9), as shown in Table 3. We also controlled both 
bank-specific variables, such as BSIZE, LSH, DSH and MGTQ, and macroeconomic 
variables, such as GDPPCG and INFL. Moreover, we took Islamic banks (1= Islamic 
bank, 0= otherwise) as a dummy and also controlled for year, bank, and country 
effects. 
Figure 2. 
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Table 3. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the PCSEs Regression Model (Full Sample)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
DFI
-1.214*** -0.827*** -0.728*** -1.224*** -0.825*** -0.768*** -0.789*** -0.688*** 0.048
(0.224) (0.199) (0.219) (0.219) (0.196) (0.214) (0.253) (0.224) (0.261)
BSIZE
-0.232*** -0.240*** -0.260*** -0.210*** -0.218*** -0.237*** -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.301***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
LSH
-1.112*** -1.106*** -0.798*** -1.158*** -1.150*** -0.836*** -1.559*** -1.592*** -1.443***
(0.287) (0.291) (0.292) (0.276) (0.279) (0.281) (0.306) (0.307) (0.308)
DSH
0.585** 0.612** 0.620** 0.549** 0.578** 0.585** 0.126 0.136 0.170
(0.237) (0.238) (0.242) (0.233) (0.235) (0.237) (0.246) (0.245) (0.250)
AG
-0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MGTQ
-0.084 -0.092 -0.455 -0.046 -0.056 -0.432 -0.452 -0.416 -0.592
(0.349) (0.352) (0.354) (0.351) (0.354) (0.354) (0.385) (0.386) (0.387)
GDPPCG
0.016 -0.000 -0.024 0.022 0.005 -0.018 0.002 -0.001 -0.033
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024)
INFL
0.012** 0.013** 0.008 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.013** -0.017*** -0.016** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Islamic bank 0.149** 0.138* 0.058 0.159** 0.148** 0.067 0.317*** 0.321*** 0.265***
(0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.070) (0.086) (0.087) (0.085)
Country-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1740 1740 1740 1746 1746 1746 1609 1609 1609
R2 0.114 0.110 0.108 0.118 0.113 0.112 0.138 0.138 0.133
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
The results in Table 3 suggest that for the full sample overall DFI has a negative 
impact on bank default risk, leverage risk, and portfolio risk, as shown by the 
negative coefficient of overall DFI. The relationship is significant at the 1% level for 
all types of bank risk-taking. Furthermore, ACCESS has also a negative relationship 
with DR, LR, and PR at the 1% level of significance, while USAGE has a negative 
relation with DR and LR, also at the 1% level of significance. However, USAGE 
has a positive relation with PR, which is insignificant. These relationships imply 
that for each of the reported specifications, the stronger the digitally inclusive 
financial system is, the lower the level of bank-risk tendency, which means that 
development of digital finance stabilises the banking sector. Moreover, BSIZE, 
LSH, AG, and MGTQ have a negative relationship with all types of bank risk-
taking; of these, BSIZE, LSH and AG are significant, but MGTQ is insignificant. On 
the other hand, DSH has a positive relationship with the level of bank risk-taking 
and is significant for DR and LR, but insignificant for PR. INFL and GDPPCG have 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 7, Number 2, 2021 417
a mixed relationship with the level of bank risk-taking, with INFL significant but 
GDPPCG insignificant in all specifications.
4.1.3. Islamic vs Conventional Banks: DFI and Bank Risk-taking
In this subsection, we split our sample based on bank type (conventional or 
Islamic) to observe how DFI affects the individual bank-type industry. This was 
done because Islamic banks are relatively new compared to conventional ones, and 
most of the latter adopted fintech-based technologies in their existing operational 
activities earlier than Islamic banks. In addition, the two banking operational 
philosophies are also different. Therefore, we expect a significant difference 
in the DFI-bank risk-taking nexus for both types of banking. Table 4 shows the 
association of DFI with Islamic bank risk-taking, while Table 5 shows this with 
conventional banks. In the two tables, we did not control the Islamic bank dummy, 
as we had already riven our sample based on bank type. We consider 73 Islamic 
banks in Table 4 and 210 conventional ones in Table 5, as our new sample size and 
PCSEs model have also been considered for this analysis.
Table 4. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the PCSEs Regression Model (Islamic Banks)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
DFI
0.081 0.267 -0.790 0.056 0.232 -0.750 0.723* 0.284 1.934***
(0.347) (0.327) (0.486) (0.340) (0.321) (0.486) (0.403) (0.385) (0.553)
BSIZE
-0.409*** -0.413*** -0.398*** -0.369*** -0.373*** -0.359*** -0.504*** -0.495*** -0.495***
(0.071) (0.072) (0.069) (0.061) (0.062) (0.059) (0.072) (0.073) (0.070)
LSH
-0.058 -0.032 -0.227 0.007 0.032 -0.151 -0.105 -0.209 0.264
(0.633) (0.630) (0.616) (0.572) (0.570) (0.560) (0.759) (0.757) (0.766)
DSH
0.552 0.557 0.502 0.656 0.661 0.610 1.113* 1.104* 1.153*
(0.495) (0.497) (0.494) (0.462) (0.463) (0.463) (0.635) (0.639) (0.594)
AG
-0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006** -0.007** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
 MGTQ
-0.895 -0.967* -0.717 -0.886 -0.953* -0.724 -1.116 -0.942 -1.307**
(0.565) (0.561) (0.548) (0.551) (0.547) (0.536) (0.682) (0.677) (0.659)
GDPPCG
-0.047* -0.054* -0.030 -0.043 -0.049* -0.028 -0.049 -0.035 -0.057*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.034) (0.030)
INFL
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.017** -0.017* -0.012
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
Country-
fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 455 455 455 457 457 457 423 423 423
R2 0.239 0.240 0.245 0.241 0.242 0.246 0.237 0.233 0.262
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
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In Table 4, in relation to Islamic banks, the overall DFI interestingly has a 
positive relationship with the level of bank risk-taking, although the relationship 
is insignificant, apart from PR, which is significant at the 10% level. ACCESS has a 
positive relationship with bank risk-taking, but is insignificant in all specifications. 
USAGE has a mixed relationship with bank risk-taking. It is negatively related 
with DR and LR, although at insignificant levels, but is significantly related with 
PR. Compared to to commercial banks overall, LSH and AG are insignificant, but 
MGTQ and GDPPCG are negative and have mixed significance for the Islamic 
banks. 
Table 5. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the PCSEs Regression Model
(Conventional Banks)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
DFI
-1.710*** -1.128*** -0.753*** -1.723*** -1.124*** -0.808*** -1.318*** -0.900*** -0.513*
(0.288) (0.242) (0.261) (0.280) (0.237) (0.254) (0.323) (0.274) (0.307)
BSIZE
-0.175*** -0.187*** -0.222*** -0.156*** -0.169*** -0.203*** -0.227*** -0.235*** -0.266***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041)
LSH
-1.496*** -1.506*** -1.067*** -1.570*** -1.578*** -1.128*** -1.987*** -2.010*** -1.687***
(0.317) (0.320) (0.329) (0.311) (0.315) (0.323) (0.341) (0.343) (0.350)
DSH
0.891*** 0.922*** 0.958*** 0.789*** 0.824*** 0.860*** 0.213 0.236 0.261
(0.277) (0.279) (0.285) (0.281) (0.283) (0.288) (0.272) (0.273) (0.282)
AG
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
 MGTQ
-0.124 -0.042 -0.465 -0.062 0.018 -0.432 -0.484 -0.415 -0.717
(0.477) (0.482) (0.495) (0.483) (0.487) (0.499) (0.492) (0.494) (0.506)
GDPPCG
0.035 0.005 -0.054 0.044 0.014 -0.045 -0.016 -0.037 -0.085**
(0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.040) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043) (0.039)
INFL
0.000 0.005 -0.004 0.003 0.008 -0.002 -0.046*** -0.042** -0.047***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Country-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1285 1285 1285 1289 1289 1289 1186 1186 1186
R2 0.103 0.096 0.088 0.105 0.097 0.090 0.139 0.136 0.131
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
For conventional banks (as shown in Table 5), overall DFI, ACCESS and 
USAGE are significantly negatively associated with all types of bank risk-taking. 
The findings on all the other control variables are similar to those of the overall 
sample banks (in Table 3).
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4.2. Robustness 
Though possible reverse causality (endogeneity) is a common identification issue 
in any banking research, it may be less of a problem in this study, as it investigates 
the role of DFI (a country-level indicator) in bank risk-taking (a bank-level 
indicator). Nevertheless, in order to ensure the robustness of the results and to 
minimise possible endogeneity issues, following Kim et al. (2020) the 2SLS-IV 
technique was conducted. 
We searched recent empirical studies on banking stability/bank risk-taking 
and financial inclusion to choose suitable instrumental variables (IVs) to address 
any potential endogeneity issue. Following Ahamed and Mallick (2019) and Banna 
(2020b), this study considers the proportion of mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 
people) (MSH) in other countries in the same region as an instrumental variable 
for the 2SLS-IV technique. We categorised countries based on high-income, and 
included South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia & 
Pacific, and the Middle East & North Africa regions. It is argued that banking 
operation costs, as well as physical and financial infrastructural deficiencies, can 
be reduced through good communication infrastructure (Beck et al., 2007) and 
excessive use of mobile phones (Allen et al., 2014). Therefore, a large number of 
mobile subscriptions helps to make unbanked people banked, which will not 
directly affect bank risk-taking, but may influence DFI. 
In addition, we consider the percentage of adults borrowing from friends and family 
during emergency funding (FnF) as an instrumental variable. It has been found that 
the key source of borrowing during emergency situations in developing countries 
is friends and family (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012). It has also been shown 
that only 9% of the adults borrow from the formal financial sector, whereas 29% 
borrow from friends and family. The higher percentage of adults borrowing from 
friends and family may influence DFI, but will not directly affect banks’ risk-taking 
tendency (Ahamed & Mallick, 2019).
Table 6. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the 2SLS-IV Regression Model (Full Sample)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
DFI
-1.523*** -1.076*** -0.633** -1.549*** -1.087*** -0.639** -1.178*** -0.912** -0.277
(0.419) (0.362) (0.265) (0.381) (0.330) (0.250) (0.453) (0.403) (0.332)
BSIZE
-0.142** -0.155** -0.195*** -0.119* -0.133** -0.172*** -0.232*** -0.237*** -0.277***
(0.067) (0.069) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.055)
LSH
-0.909** -0.871** -0.809* -0.949** -0.910** -0.833** -1.551*** -1.538*** -1.441***
(0.412) (0.413) (0.420) (0.398) (0.398) (0.405) (0.426) (0.425) (0.431)
DSH
0.599 0.656* 0.659* 0.573 0.631 0.629 -0.052 -0.027 0.015
(0.374) (0.373) (0.390) (0.392) (0.392) (0.409) (0.364) (0.363) (0.376)
AG
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
 MGTQ
-0.676 -0.667 -0.855 -0.573 -0.564 -0.771 -0.913 -0.893 -1.044*
(0.499) (0.501) (0.526) (0.491) (0.492) (0.519) (0.577) (0.576) (0.606)
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Table 6. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the 2SLS-IV Regression Model (Full Sample)
(Continued)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
GDPPCG
0.099** 0.084* 0.006 0.117*** 0.102** 0.022 0.038 0.032 -0.039
(0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.048) (0.049) (0.047)
INFL
0.014 0.017 0.001 0.019* 0.021** 0.006 -0.015 -0.012 -0.022**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Islamic bank
0.236 0.211 0.150 0.234 0.209 0.147 0.490*** 0.475*** 0.408**
(0.152) (0.152) (0.143) (0.147) (0.147) (0.138) (0.168) (0.168) (0.162)
Country-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1572 1572 1572 1578 1578 1578 1445 1445 1445
R2 0.1025 0.0965 0.0943 0.1029 0.0962 0.0939 0.1472 0.1411 0.1354
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
For the full sample, the 2SLS-IV regression model does not change the main 
finding of the analysis shown in Table 3, but does show a stronger relationship 
between DFI (DFI, ACCESS, and USAGE) and the level of bank risk-taking by 
providing a higher coefficient (shown in Table 6). Therefore, the findings indicate 
the robustness of the PCSEs regression results and suggest that overall the DFI, 
ACCESS, and USAGE indices have a significant negative impact on the level 
of bank risk-taking in the sample countries. Most of the control variable results 
remain unchanged. 
Table 7. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the 2SLS-IV Regression Model (Islamic Banks)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
DFI
0.010 0.256 -1.220 0.065 0.182 -1.100 0.291 0.153 0.604
(0.587) (0.518) (0.939) (0.583) (0.531) (0.881) (0.604) (0.563) (0.932)
BSIZE
-0.411** -0.424** -0.358* -0.341** -0.354** -0.297* -0.277* -0.271* -0.273*
(0.199) (0.203) (0.192) (0.173) (0.176) (0.165) (0.159) (0.161) (0.142)
LSH
-0.185 -0.161 -0.668 -0.232 -0.203 -0.664 -0.503 -0.551 -0.179
(0.611) (0.601) (0.796) (0.636) (0.628) (0.795) (0.815) (0.796) (0.951)
DSH
0.765 0.781 0.492 0.685 0.705 0.444 0.152 0.128 0.172
(0.971) (0.981) (0.999) (1.008) (1.015) (1.058) (1.304) (1.301) (1.250)
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Table 7. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the 2SLS-IV Regression Model (Islamic Banks)
(Continued)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
AG
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
 MGTQ
-1.560* -1.602* -1.441 -1.405* -1.447* -1.300 -2.460 -2.415 -2.578*
(0.892) (0.898) (0.950) (0.827) (0.832) (0.887) (1.511) (1.486) (1.509)
GDPPCG
0.061 0.047 0.066 0.058 0.044 0.060 -0.015 -0.009 -0.006
(0.076) (0.075) (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.059)
INFL -0.007 -0.007 -0.014 -0.000 -0.001 -0.007 -0.038* -0.037* -0.033*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Country-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 336 336 336 338 338 338 308 308 308
R2 0.2225 0.2226 0.2385 0.2041 0.2037 0.2179 0.2772 0.2770 0.2804
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
Table 7 shows the 2SLS-IV regression findings for Islamic banks. The nexus of 
DFI and bank risk-taking does not change the sign, which confirms the robustness 
of the previous PCSEs regression results (see Table 4) for Islamic banks. The 
findings suggest that the nexus of DFI-bank risk-taking for Islamic banks is not 
significant in comparison to commercial banks overall and/or their counterpart 
conventional banks. The control variables remain unchanged.
Table 8. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the 2SLS-IV Regression Model
(Conventional Banks)
DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
DFI
-2.078*** -1.514*** -0.636** -2.074*** -1.506*** -0.678** -1.712*** -1.265*** -0.475
(0.504) (0.431) (0.284) (0.445) (0.385) (0.271) (0.547) (0.482) (0.371)
BSIZE
-0.064 -0.076 -0.135** -0.052 -0.065 -0.122** -0.200*** -0.207*** -0.260***
(0.063) (0.064) (0.059) (0.061) (0.062) (0.057) (0.065) (0.066) (0.061)
LSH
-1.006** -1.014** -0.868* -1.037** -1.047** -0.879* -1.727*** -1.754*** -1.583***
(0.488) (0.488) (0.502) (0.464) (0.463) (0.478) (0.485) (0.481) (0.500)
DSH
0.685 0.748* 0.830* 0.675 0.742 0.810* -0.083 -0.044 0.046
(0.435) (0.436) (0.453) (0.451) (0.453) (0.469) (0.329) (0.333) (0.342)
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DR LR PR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE DFI ACCESS USAGE
AG
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
 MGTQ
-0.529 -0.483 -0.574 -0.450 -0.409 -0.531 -0.509 -0.466 -0.567
(0.654) (0.655) (0.666) (0.648) (0.650) (0.667) (0.701) (0.698) (0.713)
GDPPCG
0.118** 0.104** -0.028 0.140*** 0.126** -0.007 0.060 0.050 -0.064
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059)
INFL
0.028 0.034 -0.009 0.029 0.035* -0.008 -0.003 0.002 -0.030
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Country-fixed 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1236 1236 1236 1240 1240 1240 1137 1137 1137
R2 0.0942 0.0866 0.0815 0.0967 0.0881 0.0819 0.1279 0.1253 0.1212
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
For the conventional banks, the findings using the 2SLS-IV regression (shown 
in Table 8) do not change the results of the PCSEs (Table 5), which confirms the 
robustness of the findings that DFI, ACCESS, and USAGE are negatively and 
significantly associated with the levels of bank risk-taking. In addition, the control 
variables remain unaffected. 
Up to this point, we have taken static panel regression estimators. We now 
deploy dynamic panel regression - two-step system generalised method of 
moments (GMM) to estimate the results and validate our previous findings, as 
presented in Table 9. The main findings of the dynamic model also validate our 
results. The insignificant p-value of AR (2) and the Hansen test justify the model 
validity. Moreover, the smaller number of instruments than number of groups 
also validates our GMM model specifications in Table 9. Furthermore, we also 
controlled the traditional financial inclusion index (e.g., ATMs or bank branches) 
and considered the traditional risk-taking proxy (e.g., the non-performing loans 
ratio). In all cases, our main results remain unchanged4.
4 The results are available upon request.
Table 8. 
DFI and Bank Risk-Taking Using the 2SLS-IV Regression Model
(Conventional Banks) (Continued)
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4.3. Analysis
Bank risk-taking for both conventional and Islamic banks is important, especially 
if a dual banking system co-exists in an economy. Therefore, it is necessary to 
distinguish the extent of such risk-taking in terms of Islamic and conventional 
banking types. Our findings suggest that the bank types differ significantly based 
on their risk-taking, with Islamic banks showing a higher degree, but a lower 
degree of bank stability), compared to conventional banks. Our findings are in 
line with those of Bitar, Naceur, Ayadi, & Walker (2020) and Smaoui, Mimouni, 
Miniaoui, & Temimi (2020), who found that Islamic banks took more risks than 
conventional ones.
The negative DFI-bank risk-taking relationship suggests that an increase in the 
DFI index reduces the level of bank risk-taking. The economic value of the results 
suggests that DFI has a significant impact on the level of bank risk-taking, which 
means that it enriches the soundness of individual banks in the sample countries. 
This indicates that DFI is not only statistically significant, but also economically 
important, as in strengthening individual banks in the sample, it not only reduces 
the default risk, leverage risk, and portfolio risk of the individual banks, but also 
increases their financial mobility, even in the face of crisis. These findings are 
similar to those of previous studies (e.g., Ahamed & Mallick, 2019; Banna, 2020b; 
Banna, Hassan, & Alam, 2020b; Morgan & Pontines, 2018), which show that a 
financial system with inclusive DFS tends to boost banking stability, and that the 
greater implementation of DFI moderates the excessive risk-taking of particular 
banks. Moreover, it is also advocated that a digitally inclusive banking sector 
may help banks to generate a good level of client deposits cheaply, mitigate the 
financial constraints of SMEs and individuals, and increase financial mobilisation.
Table 9. 




Lagged of DR 0.249*** -0.256*** -0.274***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
DFI -1.024*** -0.620** -0.623**
(0.381) (0.364) (0.301)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Year-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
Arellano-Bond test - AR (2) (P-value) 0.163 0.174 0.161
Hansen (P-value) 0.270 0.251 0.225
Obs. 1324 1324 1324
Number of Groups 251 251 251
Number of Instruments 219 219 219
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1
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The results also indicate that conventional banks are more sensitive than Islamic 
ones in terms of the DFI-bank risk-taking nexus in the sample countries. Although 
overall DFI, ACCESS, and USAGE have a significant negative relationship with 
the level of bank risk-taking in the full sample and in conventional banks, the 
insignificant positive relationship between the DFI indices and Islamic bank risk-
taking can be explained by the fact that these banks are still in an immature phase. 
Therefore, a large amount of capital, and high operational, communication, and 
coordination costs are involved in establishing their digitalised financial system, 
which can put great financial pressure on the banks to increase their risk level in 
the short-run (Wang et al., 2020). In some of the specifications, our study finds an 
insignificant nexus of USAGE-bank risk-taking, which suggests that people in the 
sample countries have sufficient access to digital financial services, as banks and 
other Fintech companies are trying to provide mobile/internet banking facilities 
and/or agent outlets services in these areas. However, people in these particular 
regions are reluctant to use the existing mobile/online services, preferring cash 
transactions. This finding is supported by a recent study by the World Bank and 
Mastercard, who found that more than 90% of financial transactions in developing 
countries are made with cash (Unnikrishnan, Larson, Pinpradab, & Brown, 2019). 
This can be explained by the fact that the practice of digital finance in these regions 
is still at an early stage, and people lack digital literacy, especially older ones. 
Therefore, it may take time to make people conversant with technology and digital 
financial services. 
Moreover, the advancement of digital finance products reachable through 
mobile phones or computers can reduce face-to-face interactions (which is 
essential in minimising the spread of the Covid-19 virus), but continue to keep 
people connected to their financial transactions/activities. Consequently, DFI not 
only aids the banking of unbanked/disadvantaged people, but also benefits banks 
by allowing them to collect low-priced retail deposits from a massive clientele base 
(Ahamed & Mallick, 2019). This can minimise the liquidity problems of banks in 
times of crisis (e.g., the current Covid-19 pandemic), which ultimately reduces the 
level of bank risk-taking. Moreover, DFI can also help banks to lend money to their 
vast clientele, including SMEs and the other vulnerable groups, which eventually 
improves financial stability by lowering default risk (Morgan & Pontines, 2018). 
Therefore, the mobility restrictions put in place to contain the Covid-19 pandemic 
have encouraged the banking sector to implement DFS at a rapid pace. 
Furthermore, DFI helps financial and monetary system regulators to reduce 
the level of inflation by restricting the circulation of physical cash (Danisman & 
Tarazi, 2020). In addition, during any pandemic such as Covid-19, DFI is expected 
to help governments to reach out to those in the informal sector who have no 
access to formal bank accounts and to provide quick and secure financial support 
as an emergency response (Allmen, Khera, Ogawa, & Sahay, 2020). 
Therefore, an inclusive digitalised banking industry ensures sustainable 
economic growth, which is likely to help maintain financial sustainability in times 
of economic crisis. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Conclusion
This paper has examined the relationship between digital financial inclusion and 
the levels of bank risk-taking, using a sample of 283 banks from six countries over 
the period 2011 to 2019. The findings suggest that Islamic banks take more risks 
than conventional ones. The empirical evidence also indicates that digital financial 
inclusion is negatively associated with the level of bank risk-taking for the overall 
commercial banks and conventional banks compared to Islamic banks. Such a 
strong association suggests that the proper implementation of digital financial 
inclusion reduces the risk-taking behaviour of banks. Consequently, an inclusive 
digitalised banking industry will ensure sustainable economic growth, which is 
likely to help maintain financial sustainability in times of economic crisis such as 
during the Covid-19 pandemic. Our results have been demonstrated to be robust 
through various robustness checks. 
5.2. Recommendations
Based on our findings, policymakers, regulators and standard setters should 
consider the following implications and policy recommendations. First, the 
weak nexus of digital financial inclusion and bank risk-taking for Islamic banks 
indicates that they need to expand their agent networks and digitalise their existing 
products and services by deploying artificial intelligence and machine learning to 
appeal to people of all economic classes. In addition, the findings also suggest that 
people should be provided with proper digital financial literacy by organising 
campaigns, seminars, and workshops. Next, banks should also introduce services 
to show how unbanked people can open an account from their home through their 
electronic devices, as the Covid-19 crisis makes them disinclined to go to bank 
branch/agent outlets physically to conduct business. 
Finally, to minimise technological and internet glitches, banks should upgrade 
their databases and launch a Quick Response Code-based money withdrawal 
system, which already prevails in countries such as Singapore and Turkey. 
The study has some limitations; for example, we could not consider all 
dual banking countries in our analysis due to digital financial inclusion data 
unavailability. Moreover, we did not split our sample based on geographical 
location, income level, and ownership structure due to the limited number of 
countries. However, in turn, these limitations create opportunities for future 
research, in which geographical location, income level, and ownership structure 
could be taken into consideration.
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